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J L E R H A P S T H E M O S T F R E Q U E N T complaint of students studying 
poetry is that the process of analyzing or interpreting poetic lan-
guage takes away from the pleasure of reading it. It is an argu-
ment which in its naive sense is fairly easy to counter. We say-
that a reading of a poem is inevitably an interpretation of it, and 
that in closely analyzing it we are simply extending the process of 
reading and deepening the pleasure to be gained. As a reply this 
seems unexceptionable, and it is surely the case that a truly close 
reading enables us to take greater possession of the experience the 
text is offering us. A n d yet most teachers wil l have had the all 
too frequent experience of working through a poem with students, 
paying close attention to the detail of the text, only to be left at 
the end with something totally inert, as if the poem has died 
under their hands. Someone, we may be sure, wil l quote at us 
Wordsworth's warning "we murder to dissect,"1 and despite the 
ease with which this may be thrown at anyone engaged in critical 
enquiry, it is a charge that sticks perennially to teachers of litera-
ture. The suspicion that we are interfering with the texts rather 
than enhancing them is part of the guilty luggage that as teachers 
we carry about with us, rather like those comically pathetic 
pedants of the Academy of Lagado with their sacks on their 
backs containing the dead things they have substituted for a 
living language. 
There is a sense in which the anxiety I am talking about is 
particularly acute in reading Romantic poetry. This is partly 
because the imaginative appeal of the poetry is so strong that it 
exceeds what we are sometimes able to say about it, and yet our 
critical procedures often seem committed to the notion of the 
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total explicability of the text. The Romantics are, however, con-
tinually telling us that there are things which defy analysis. In-
deed, a fundamental assumption of Romanticism is that experi-
ence transcends understanding, not in the sense that there is too 
much of it to be intelligently comprehended but in the far more 
challenging sense that it is quintessentially "other" to the pro-
cesses of human comprehension. T o see this is to approach one of 
the central dilemmas of Romanticism, namely, how is it possible 
to explain or account for that which by its very nature resists 
attempts at explication? This is why it lays so much characteristic 
stress on visionary and hypernormal states of perception : they are 
conditions of encounter not subject to the normal closures of the 
rational mind. It is also why the crisis points for much Romantic 
verse come at precisely those moments when the mind, instead of 
registering the shock of experience begins to shape it too mani-
festly. It is not so much feeling joy which is important to Words-
worth and the Romantic poets as the capacity continually to be 
"surprised" by it. 
In Book V of The Prelude Wordsworth, after lamenting the 
failures of much contemporary education expresses a wish for 
"Knowledge not purchased by the loss of power!" (1. 4 2 5 ) . The 
attempt to acquire such knowledge, and the sad recognition that 
it often involves "the loss of power," is a recurring feature of 
Romanticism. But it is also a recurring feature of the reader's 
own experience. One cannot claim that students who say a Blake 
lyric or Wordsworth sonnet defy analysis are really saying any-
thing original or profound. A t the same time, however, they are 
not valueless comments. If we extend the point they become 
genuine insights. We can perceive them as saying that there is 
about the poems something which is not itself the object of 
thought, something which cannot be known, but which is the 
reason we know what we do about the texts. It is Wordsworth's 
or Blake's "power" they are responding to, that element which 
brings into being the poems as a whole and which constitutes the 
complete mode of their existence. T o say this is to relate the 
experience of readers to the concerns of the poetry itself. For 
Romantic verse is continually speculating about the existence of 
some power that generates perception but which cannot itself be 
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perceived. Terms like "wise passiveness" or "negative capability" 
describe the process by which that perception comes into being 
but not its origin. 
M u c h of the uniqueness of Romantic poetry lies in its almost 
exclusive concern with the dynamics of its own origin. As such it 
foregrounds what is perhaps always present in the creative pro-
cess. Any truly memorable poem impresses us with the sense of 
something that eludes critical articulation. It is only because of 
this that analysis continues to be possible, otherwise the poem 
would be exhausted by our attentions and would cease to be read. 
The significance of Romantic poetry is that the idea of the in-
comprehensible is fundamental to its procedures and an inherent 
part of its perceptions about reality. Because of this it poses the 
greatest challenge to forms of analysis which take their cue from 
semiotics. The text can only be considered as a form of communi-
cation in so far as what it has to say can be translated into known 
and accepted cognitive patterns. But if poems are unique utter-
ances, totally individual linguistic events then the experiences 
they offer can be found nowhere else; the language of communi-
cations can have no vocabulary for them. The only vocabulary 
exists in the poetry in the form that it is. 
The paradoxes of communication and the difficulty of explicat-
ing the seemingly inexplicable are principal preoccupations of the 
Romantic poets. They generate, for example, the complex sub-
tleties of Keats's "Ode on a Grecian U r n . " It is the power of art 
to affect us more than we can adequately account for that Keats's 
poem ponders. The urn, Keats says, can "express / A flowery tale 
more sweetly than our rhyme": and the wording is quite par-
ticular here.2 It is not that the urn has more to express in quanti-
tative terms than the poem, but that it is able to do it "more 
sweetly." It is the indefinable beauty of the urn, its negative 
capability, which is the centre of Keats's rapt contemplation. 
"[UJnheard" melodies are "sweeter," not because they differ 
notationally from heard music but because they are encountered 
in a dimension that renders them so, and one moreover that is 
beyond normal communication. The urn "tease [s] us out of 
thought" not simply by baffling thought but by taking us beyond 
it. 
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Keats's mode of attention, his way of "reading" the urn, is 
close to the way the reader encounters the poem. The opening 
lines describing the urn could be describing the poem Keats is 
writing about it ; it too is "st i l l ," fixed on the page before us, it 
too is untarnished by time, always bride-like because always to 
be experienced for the first time. Like the urn it exists in 
"silence," and yet paradoxically it has something to say; its 
sweetness is similarly unheard. The peculiar resonance of the 
poem lies in the way it is debating the status of its own existence 
and as such, including the reader's experience as part of its argu-
ment. Interestingly, Keats's attention is not in any way analytic. 
There is nothing about the formal or structural properties of the 
urn. His gaze is if anything almost childlike in its inquisitiveness 
—• "What maidens loth? . . . Who are these coming to the sacri-
fice?" The extraordinary idea of the town's eternal emptiness is 
of the kind that suggests the baffled wondering simplicity of the 
child. The very shape of the poem, its lack of resolution, its ques-
tions that cannot be answered, indicate the existence of some-
thing too large to be comprehended. 
If we ask what that is, it surely has to do with Keats's desire to 
experience the perfection of the urn at a deeper level than that of 
conscious articulation. The driving urgency of the poem is his 
desire to become the urn, to interiorize its wholeness. Keats's 
desire is to penetrate beyond language, to lift the veil of Moneta 
("The Fal l of Hyperion") , and reach a level of pure experience. 
It is the moment when, in Virginia Woolf's words, "we are parts 
of the work of art. . . . we are the words; we are the music; we 
are the thing itself."3 The impossibility of this total identification 
except as a momentary imaginative event is what Keats thinks 
endlessly about. Beauty haunts us, the poem suggests, because it 
is forever out of reach. Works of art cannot be possessed. Indeed, 
for Keats, the moment of possession is the moment of loss: 
beauty is truth turns on the instant to beauty is untruth. 
Possession precipitates loss. For Keats the dynamics of the imag-
ination are both creative and destructive, and the natural para-
digm for this is the cyclic pattern of the seasons — "Nature's 
law," as he calls it in "Hyperion" (1. 181 ). This perhaps helps to 
explain the relative flatness of the last stanza of "Ode on a 
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Grecian U r n " : this is Keats's moment of possession, the point at 
which the urn has become known and reduced to a message. The 
problem with the "Beauty is truth, truth beauty," formula is 
not that it is opaque — its resonance through the years is evident 
witness of its ability to stimulate if not to satisfy thought — but 
in the fact that Keats has to say it at all . For the power of Keats's 
poem lies not in his ability to talk about beauty but to demon-
strate it. It is not what the urn says that is important but what it 
does. The point at which the meaning of the urn becomes clear is 
the point at which it is lost. But because it wi l l "remain, in midst 
of other woe" it can always be recovered, and as for the reader, 
he can always return to the opening of the poem. 
What Keats does in his poem is to transform the urn from an 
object into a subject : to give it the force and presence of a living 
entity. T o do this involves a certain sleight of hand but it ac-
knowledges an important emotional truth: that whilst the art 
object may be fixed and dead it nevertheless has the mystery and 
power of something living. Romantic poetry is in its various ways 
continually attempting to change the relationship between per-
ceiver and perceived, to make us see "thro" and not "with . . . the 
Eye." 4 For Keats the process is a tragic one since the "otherness" 
of beauty must always exclude us. The case is somewhat different 
however for Wordsworth. Like Keats, he also contemplates a 
power in experience that resists comprehension but unlike Keats 
its presence is for Wordsworth an indication that life is not trag-
ically patterned. The quintessential "otherness" of living forms is 
a guarantee of our own. "Points have we all of us within our 
souls I Where all stand single," Wordsworth says in The Prelude 
(III . 1 8 5 - 8 6 ) , and for Wordsworth it is the experience of 
singleness, of total uniqueness, which is the true drive of all 
organic life. 
If we see Wordsworth's poetry as attempting to talk about that 
which is beyond conscious articulation, which can be felt but not 
made into an object of knowledge we can enter as readers into 
the enormous ambition of his work. If he ultimately fails it is 
because there is no way in which he could really succeed. Indeed, 
there is a sense in which we suspect him at precisely those mo-
ments in which he seems to be most secure. What most modern 
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readers admire in him is the tentative thoughtfulness that often 
lies behind his most grand moments. It is there, as Geoffrey 
Durrani has noted, 5 in the central passage from "Tintern Abbey" 
where Wordsworth tries to be as specific as possible about what 
he has felt in nature : 
And I have felt 
A presence that disturbs me with the joy 
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime 
Of something far more deeply interfused, 
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns, 
And the round ocean and the living air, 
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man : 
A motion and a s p i r i t , . . . . (11. 93-100) 
It is easy to feel that Wordsworth is imposing on himself and on 
the reader here by a vague rhetorical grandeur. But the passage 
is carefully and deliberately composed around certain paradoxes : 
a joy that "disturbs," a power which is in "motion" and yet is 
settled, "dwelling," which needs the imagery of height, "ele-
vated," and depth, "deeply interfused," to express it, and which 
engages the emotions and the mind. Each of these statements is 
discrete and yet builds on the others. It is when we come to ask 
what Wordsworth is really talking about that the difficulties arise. 
Terms like "organic unity" or "pantheism" spring to mind, but it 
is precisely to avoid such labels that Wordsworth has striven so 
deliberately. H e has various attempts himself at saying what it is 
— "presence . . . sense sublime . . . something. . . motion . . . spirit" 
— none of which have any secure meaning. It is impossible for 
the reader to be sure about precisely what is being said, and that 
difficulty is surely basic to the meaning of the experience Words-
worth is trying to share with us. Our difficulty in understanding 
it is related to the poet's difficulty in writing about it. We are 
made to share a common sense of limited comprehension, of a 
central obscurity that exists despite attempts to dispel it and 
which is powered by an emotional not a cognitive truth — " A n d 
I have felt." The meaning of the passage exists not despite its 
uncertainty, but because of it. 
What Wordsworth is attempting in this passage is to turn that 
which generates feeling and thought into an object of thought. 
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The impossibility of doing that completely is part of the power of 
Wordsworth's statement. Indeed, it is an essential ingredient in 
all his experiences of the sublime. One can only attempt to talk 
about that which is inconceivable by using known categories of 
comprehension: personification, emblem, religious analogue. T o 
do that is to run the risk of simply labelling it. Even here, the 
risk is run in a line such as "Whose dwelling is the light of setting 
suns," which in its anthropomorphism echoes rather too closely 
traditional religious sentiment. The problem for Wordsworth is 
how to articulate that which is fundamentally untranslatable, 
which can only exist in the form in which it is originally experi-
enced. It is a problem that exists whether the poet is writing 
about nature experiences or encounters with people. Words-
worth's people are rarely, if ever, characters. H e is not really 
interested in character traits, in those elements, that is, that make 
someone recognizable and knowable. His concern is with that 
which resists being known, and which remains to challenge us 
precisely because of that. Wordsworth's solitary figures are all 
fundamentally remote and mysterious, they do not yield up the 
secret of their being even to the poet's meditative gaze. In fact, it 
is always possible that Wordsworth has misread them, but the 
possibility only exists because the poet has first of all created a 
powerful sense of their essential independence. The indeterminacy 
of their characters is dependant on the very power with which 
Wordsworth invests their existence. In a sense the girl in "The 
Solitary Reaper" does not exist at all, and yet her presence per-
vades the poem right from the opening line: " B E H O L D her, single 
in the field." The tone of command with its hint of Biblical 
authority, the implication of " B E H O L D , " suggesting a certain 
quality of attention, and the force of "single," create the object 
of attention for us as a living presence existing now — the present 
tense is important here. We are never allowed to know her and 
yet her reality is all the greater for not being penetrated. 
Similarly with the leech gatherer. Wordsworth manages in 
"Resolution and Independence" to suggest far more by exclusion 
than inclusion of character detail. The leech gatherer remains 
essentially unknowable. Wordsworth's questions " H o w is it that 
you live, and what is it you do?" (st. xvi i , 1. 1 1 9 ) go unanswered 
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as do Keats's in the "Ode on a Grecian U r n . " The refusal of 
experience to yield precise answers is the clue to much of the 
urgency that lies behind both poems. In "Resolution and Inde-
pendence" it is initially a cause for anxiety — Wordsworth is 
oppressed as in Book V I of The Prelude by "thoughts of what 
and whither, when and how" (1. 6 3 0 ) — b u t through the 
agency of the old man it eventually becomes a cause for reassur-
ance. It is Wordsworth's implicit recognition that experience 
resists comprehension because it transcends it that powers the 
ending of the poem. As such the poem takes a risk, but it is one 
that is fundamental to what it is essentially doing. The images of 
the huge stone, the strange sea beast, and the large cloud, seem 
in some ways comically inappropriate to the deformed old man, 
but the point is that the man's intense singleness of being can 
only be registered by techniques that unrealize him as a literal 
object and which invest him with the status of a subject. Words-
worth's concern after all, despite the title of the poem, is not so 
much with easily identifiable qualities such as endurance or 
humanity, but with something the man possesses as an impersonal 
natural fact. It is what is being enacted through him that is 
important. 
A n d thus the uncertainty which surrounds the encounter — the 
qualifications "seemed" and "as if." Indeed, as a number of 
critics have noted, most of Wordsworth's intense moments of 
perception are characterized by uncertainty. It is this which helps 
to guarantee for us the reality of his experiences. The Words-
worthian awe contains a sense of vulnerability, of being caught 
off guard in a world only dimly apprehended. The boy out bird 
nesting, clinging to "the perilous ridge" hears a "strange utter-
ance" in the sound of the wind while, Wordsworth says, "the sky 
seemed not a sky / Of earth — and with what motion moved the 
clouds!" (I. 3 36-39) . But we are not told, nor can we be sure 
from the episode itself what it is that the wind utters : the message 
is untranslatable. The sense, however, of something recognized but 
not completely explicable is unmistakeable. Brian Cosgrove has 
commented on the importance of the "uncanny" in Wordsworth-
ian poetry, and on the way in which experiences hover between 
the preternatural and the supernatural. 6 They do so necessarily: 
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the sense of ambivalence is the ground of their existence. The 
tremendous effort behind Wordsworth's poetry lies in his attempt 
to make these experiences the object of thought, to try and dis-
cover in them something of the shape and meaning of life; to 
remove, in other words, the uncertainty. A n d it is surely here that 
the chief strain exists in his more ambitious poems. A good deal 
of the pain in Wordsworth's poetry has to do with his realization 
that the growth of understanding is founded on loss, that intel-
lectual certainty is achievable only at a tremendous cost. Running 
through The Prelude is a tussle between Wordsworth's attempts 
to be faithful to the experiences he has had, to express the extra-
ordinary power and resonance of them, and on the other hand 
an anxious zeal to make them mean something precise. It is the 
struggle to do this that makes the poem such a humanly moving 
work, but all too often Wordsworth falls back on a kind of secure 
knowledge that seems too easily achieved. Invocations to the 
"Wisdom and Spirit of the universe" (I. 4 0 1 ) , "the immortal 
spirit" (1. 3 4 0 ) , and "the Upholder of the tranquil soul" (III . 
117 ), signal a distinct loss of power. The problem, as Words-
worth came to realize, is that the "philosophic mind" ("Immor-
tality Ode," st. X , 1. 1 9 0 ) with its mental shorthand, damages the 
experiences it feeds off. 
M u c h of the distinctiveness then, as well as much of the inher-
ent strain of Romantic poetry lies in its attempt to use language 
in order to go beyond it. It tries characteristically, by evocation, 
suggestion, and ambiguity to return us to the full reality of un-
mediated experience, to initiate us into a world of pure being. 
The impossibility of this is implicit in the attempt, but the inti-
mation of such a world haunts us in the words on the page. For 
Keats its existence is a necessary fiction, a "belle dame sans 
merci," no sooner possessed than lost, whilst for Wordsworth it is 
the underlying grammar of all life. For the reader of the poetry, 
it is present in the process of its attempted recovery which is 
synonomous with the process of its articulation. There is a sense 
in which language stands in a special relationship to experience 
in Romantic poetry: words are events, not simply in the Stanley 
Fish sense in which all words are, but in the more particular way 
in which they become their meaning. When Keats wishes in 
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"Sleep and Poetry" for "ten years, that I may overwhelm / Myself 
in poesy; so that I may do the deed / That my own soul has to 
itself decreed" (11. 9 6 - 9 8 ) , it looks as though he is wishing for 
time to indulge himself in all the luxuries he goes on to describe. 
But what he wants is to read and eventually to write about them. 
For Keats writing is doing. But of course it never is. Words are 
continually bearing witness to their own inadequacies as carriers 
of experience. A good deal of Keats's anxiety as a poet surely has 
something to do with this. The intensity with which he loads his 
language is a measure of his desire to penetrate beyond words. 
But although he may try and join with the nightingale on "the 
viewless wings of Poesy" (st. iv, 1. 3 3 ) , the wings of language are 
not real, the escape can only be mental: words are secondary 
events. As Wordsworth realized in the "Preface to the Lyrical 
Ballads," poetic language inevitably recollects emotion, and as 
such carries within it the fact of loss. When Wordsworth says 
" B E H O L D her, single in the field," the extra liveliness of the line 
comes from the fact that what we are told to do is impossible; it 
is a fiction we entertain and one which is compounded for us by 
the fiction of the present tense. We know that the experience is 
over, its recovery in poetic form enriches it, but that enrichment 
is founded on the implicit awareness of loss. 
The kind of loss I am talking about is perhaps fundamental to 
all poetry, but it is with Romantic poetry that it becomes impor-
tant in the total sensibility and organization of the poems them-
selves. One of the things which haunts this poetry is a glimpsed 
lost identity between words and events. In early oral cultures 
words were power: poems in the form of rituals and chants 
brought rain, healed diseases, and punished enemies. Swift may 
laugh at the professor in the Academy of Lagado who believes he 
can get his students to learn by making them swallow pieces of 
paper with calculations written upon them, but the point is that 
such behaviour is only ludicrous within a highly literate culture. 
T o one with considerable oral residue it would not seem so 
strange. The oral connection even of literate language, however, 
remains strong: we still talk, for example, of eating our own 
words. Primary oral cultures preserve a sense of the word as part 
of the object it relates to. Such a perspective belongs to a world 
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view which is fundamentally mythic, in which nature and lan-
guage are not totally separate entities. Poetic metaphor carries 
within it the echo of such a world, in which nature is endowed 
with meaning not as a literary device but because it is seman-
tically conceived ; in which the descriptive word gives life to the 
object because it is part of it. It is as if one were to be inside the 
poem. 
The poet who strives for the closest relationship between word 
and event is surely Blake. For Blake, poetry is not recollection or 
re-enactment, it is the thing itself, vision: the eternal now in 
which the divisions of past and future and subject and object are 
overcome. The purpose behind the writing of Jerusalem is to 
establish the city in the very act of composition. This is why 
Blake lays so much stress on divine inspiration, because the lan-
guage needed to accomplish the task has to be of a very special 
nature. M u c h of the ambiguity and syntactic irregularity in 
Blake's verse is due to his attempt to create a lyric identity be-
tween word and event and give a new potency to poetic lan-
guage. The opening of "Tyger," for example, gains a good deal 
of its force from the fact that the word "Tyger" does not operate 
simply as a name. In Blake's usage there lies an echo of the world 
in which the name of an object shares its power; to know the 
name is to have access to it. The first line, with its rhythmic 
repetition is incantatory — whatever we understand by "Tyger" 
is being conjured into existence. From the beginning then, Blake's 
tiger exists, not as it might do in a Keats or Wordsworth poem 
as something being contemplated, but rather as something being 
invoked. As such, the poem's procedures reflect the world of 
primary orality. In "What dread hand? & what dread feet?" we 
can hear the background of necromancy and the casting of spells, 
and in "burning bright" and "forests of the night," the nursery 
rhyme mnemonics of childhood. Blake's poem penetrates the veil 
of the written language and captures the greater freedom and 
mystery of the spoken word. It implicitly asks whether we know 
what is meant by that neutral label "Tyger," and in so doing 
takes us into a realm in which our sense of established discrete 
identities is subverted by an overwhelming reality. The repeated 
questions, the lack of resolution, the circular movement, the 
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ambiguity of tone and suggestion all enact the insufficiency of the 
human mind and the insufficiency of language with its "fearful 
symmetries]," to comprehend the actuality of the tiger. Blake's 
poem attempts to raise us to the level of vision in which the 
tiger exists, not as the literal animal created by a logically insistent 
creator, but as one of the "portions of eternity" {The Marriage 
of Heaven and Hell, p. 151 ). The imagination does not recollect 
nature, it redeems i t : "As a man is, So he Sees" (letter to Dr. 
Trusler, p. 7 9 3 ) . 
A view of poetry as vision creates all kinds of difficulties for 
both poet and reader alike. This is largely because language 
imposes its own formal hierarchic structures on visionary utter-
ance. We expect a certain agreement between the various ele-
ments of a sentence even when they are subject to the deviations 
of poetic form : the assumptions of language, in other words, are 
inevitably rational. Blake's principal attack, however, is on the 
rational mind and its habit of conceptualizing experience. We 
find, not infrequently, in Blake that his verbs have several differ-
ent subjects, or that tenses are mixed in what seems an obscure 
way. Even in "Tyger," the line "What dread hand? & what 
dread feet?" is logically adrift in the poem. Because of the way in 
which Blake has revised it there is no verb to complete the sense. 
A n d yet we do not read it as meaningless. The very suppression 
of any rational context suggests the presence of something too 
frightening and awesome to articulate. A more puzzling syntactic 
problem, however, is to be found in " A h , Sun-flower" : 
Ah, Sun-flower, weary of time, 
Who countest the steps of the Sun, 
Seeking after that sweet golden clime 
Where the traveller's journey is done : 
Where the Youth pined away with desire, 
And the pale Virgin shrouded in snow 
Arise from their graves, and aspire 
Where my Sun-flower wishes to go. (p. 215) 
There are of course a number of peculiarities here, not least the 
fact that the poem has no main verb. It consists of a number of 
subordinate verbs which leave the opening clause hanging: a 
sense of incompleteness is present in the very form of the poem. 
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But more than that. There is a semantic problem about the 
"Where['s]" of the fourth and eighth lines. The poem reads as 
though the "Youth" and the " V i r g i n " are already in the place to 
which they are aspiring to go. If they "Arise from their graves" 
in the "sweet golden clime," how can they still "aspire" to go 
there? A n d yet again, we do not experience this as simply confus-
ing. The effect of the involved syntax is to prevent the reader 
from interpreting the poem as a piece of consecutive reasoning. 
Those "Where['s]" seem to be definite, and yet they are not, they 
lead back into one another with a puzzling indefiniteness. 
The perception which generates " A h , Sun-flower," is from 
wi th in the experience that it so powerfully evokes: the 
"Where['s] "dissolve our sense of time and place for a purpose. 
The "sweet golden clime" is only apparently a place, to see it 
with the eye of vision is to see it as a condition. Eternity, for 
Blake, exists not outside of time in some future land of perfection 
— to see it like that is to become trapped in a wearisome longing 
— but inside time. The youth and virgin are already potentially 
in the place they wish to go to; what is needed for its realization 
is the kind of energy suggested by the imagery of resurrection, 
"Arise from their graves" — the shedding of the old primary 
selves and the emergence of new, more positive ones. But it is a 
condition, or state of being, which cannot be attained finally or 
completely — to see it like that is still to see it as a place. It is 
always in the process of being created ; we simultaneously experi-
ence it and aspire towards it. Blake calls it living " i n eternity's 
sun rise" (p. 1 7 9 ) . Within the disruption of the normal semantic 
pattern there lies a deep internal logic of an entirely different 
order. T o perceive it is to engage in a radical act, because for 
Blake perception is action: "The wisest of the Ancients," he says, 
writing to Trusler "consider'd what is not too Explicit as the 
fittest for Instruction, because it rouses the faculties to act" (p. 
7 9 3 ) -
Blake is a poet for whom everything is present at the moment 
of writing. The immediacy of the poems, their extraordinary 
range of implication, are the products of a mind which refuses 
to see the normal divisions of experience. We cannot really be 
sure what the tiger, the sunflower, or the rose really are because 
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the pressure of the poems is to dissolve our sense of them as 
having any definable status in time or place. T o label them as 
symbols or emblems is to assume a level of subordination to some 
notional reality that Blake works to undermine. They are not 
remote in a world of mysterious "otherness," but rather very 
close to us with a peculiarly disturbing intimacy. The opening of 
" A h Sun-flower," with its powerful note of infinite regret and 
wistful longing creates an identity between speaker, reader, and 
flower which is the source of much of the poem's power : there is 
nothing between us and the experience. Blake's universe is deeply 
mythic: man contains the entire world within himself. T o per-
ceive that is to overcome the perils of single vision in which 
objects are locked in space and time, each in their separate uni-
verses and to see the ultimate unity of all life. Blake's mode of 
writing is liberationist — to make the reader arise from his grave 
and "aspire." 
The enormous strain which this puts on language is evident 
from the numerous commentaries on Blake's poetry. Words are 
not particularly good at expressing the nature of a reality which 
exists beyond them. It is also evident from the course that Blake's 
own poetry took. A visionary apprehension of things must chafe 
at the enforced accommodation to accepted syntax, rhyming 
patterns, and metres. Possibly there is even an echo of this in 
"Tyger." If we are thinking of fearful symmetries there is surely 
a sense in which we can include the poem itself, with its tight 
rhyme scheme, precise wording, and arrangement of stanzas. Per-
haps Blake is wondering at his own audacity as a creator, and if 
this is so the question " D i d he who made the Lamb make thee?" 
is not such an innocent one. A t all events, the need to construct 
an individual verse form in which the movements of the verse 
corresponded to the fluctuations of the visionary moment was 
clearly a powerful one for Blake. But one fraught with danger, 
because as T . S. Eliot remarks, the difficulty with the prophetic 
books is not that they are too visionary but that they are not 
visionary enough — rather than expressing a mythic view they 
are constructing one.7 As with Wordsworth, it is the attempt to 
make explicit what is really beyond that kind of explicitness which 
damages the experience it derives from. 
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It is, after all, the concern of the Romantics with what Words-
worth calls "unknown modes of being" (Prelude, I. 3 9 3 ) which 
haunts the reader of their poetry. If we feel the inadequacy of 
our interpretive procedures to explicate the full experience 
of their greatest poems, that is because the assumption of inade-
quacy is implicit in the poems themselves and is indeed part of 
their very argument. It is the sense we have of "Mov ing , " in 
"worlds not realised" ("Immortality Ode," st. ix, 1. 1 4 9 ) , that 
ensures the potency of the verse. We can never "realise" com-
pletely Blake's "Tyger," it must always be beyond us, and that 
sense of some potentiality existing beyond us is what the poem is 
concerned with. The pressure to "realise" however, is always 
there and it provides one of the central tensions of Romantic 
poetry in the felt need of Romantics to find a linguistic notation 
for that which must essentially resist such notation. Behind 
Keats's ambition "of doing the world some good," 8 Wordsworth's 
stoical "philosophic mind," and Blake's "I must Create a System" 
(Jerusalem, PI. x, 1. 2 0 ) we can hear an intimation of the V i c -
torian didacticism which was to triumph over the Romantic 
experience. 
For the reader it is the awareness both of the extraordinary 
resonance of language and of its inherent limitations that re-
mains. If, as Stanley Fish suggests, we see poems as events in time 
rather than spatial objects, then the nature of that resonance and 
limitation becomes clearer.9 For Fish the meaning of a text is not 
so much something embedded in it which we discover like a 
nugget of gold, but something which is enacted in us as we read : 
the process of reading is not the vehicle of meaning, it is the 
meaning. The text becomes inexhaustible not because there is 
always more in it but because there is always more in us who 
read it. T o return to the hypothetical student, the sense he has of 
something existing beyond the words on the page, something in-
definable but nonetheless potent may be because of the poem's 
ability to intimate the presence of those things in him. "The 
poem," Wallace Stevens says, "refreshes life so that we share, / 
For a moment, the first idea," it returns us, in other words, by its 
own singleness of being, to our own. 1 0 
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